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The controversy over Civil Service accountability is
symptomatic of an unstable constitution
Andrew Blick relates the recently completed Democratic Audit of the United Kingdom to the
issue Civil Service accountability. While there have been substantial changes,
the problematic constitutional principle that civil servants are only indirectly accountable to
Parliament remains.
The manner in which civil servants are held accountable f or their actions is at present a
subject of  considerable controversy. In the House of  Commons, the Public Accounts
Committee, the most senior parliamentary committee, has been pressing to hold
individual of f icials responsible f or their actions as accounting of f icers, even if  they have subsequently
moved on f rom the post.
Opponents of  this idea, such as Lord O’Donnell, f ormer Cabinet Secretary and head of  the Home Civil
Service and the senior public servants’ union (the FDA), have raised concerns about issues such as the
impact it will have on the individuals concerned and the impartiality of  Whitehall. In the House of  Lords,
the Constitution Committee has been holding a wide ranging inquiry into the accountability of  civil
servants, encompassing key tenets of  UK democracy such as individual ministerial responsibility and Civil
Service impartiality. The viability of  these principles is under scrutiny.
That these issues are being given serious and wide consideration underlines one of  the key themes
identif ied by the recently completed Democratic Audit of  the United Kingdom. The f ourth such audit to be
conducted since 1996, and the f irst published wholly online, it answers 75 individual ‘search questions’
divided into f our main blocks covering ‘cit izenship, law and rights’; ‘representative and accountable
government’; ‘civil society and popular participation’; and ‘democracy beyond the state’. Overall the Audit
identif ies 74 areas of  democratic improvement, 92 continuing concerns and 62 new or emerging concerns
since the last f ull Audit was published in 2002.
A recurring observation made during this work was that the constitutional arrangements of  the UK
suf f ered increasingly f rom instability. Ref orms, very of ten well-motivated and desirable, led to the
challenging of  existing practices, principles and institutions – yet it was not clear what might replace
them. Some examples help illustrate this point.
Block 1 of  the Audit shows how the UK constitution has shif ted increasingly f rom being ‘polit ical’ to
‘juridicial’ in nature. That is to say, in a number of  areas the courts have entered into the making of
decisions that were previously more exclusively reserved to polit icians. Under the European Communities
Act 1972, acts of  Parliament can be disapplied by the courts in so f ar as they are incompatible with
European law. The Human Rights Act 1998 requires the judiciary to uphold individual rights as set out in
the European Convention on Human Rights.
A general trend towards increased judicial review of  ministerial actions – including using Royal
Prerogative powers – exists. The Constitutional Ref orm Act 2005 in some respects appeared to provide
f or a potentially more assertive judiciary, providing a statutory underpinning f or its independence, the rule
of  law and creating the UK Supreme Court, separate f rom the House of  Lords. Yet while these
developments might be seen as challenging tradit ional notions of  an all-powerf ul Parliament, it is not
clear what kind of  arrangements they might lead to in t ime, and whether a more def inite set of
restrictions on ‘parliamentary sovereignty’ will ever come about.
Blocks 1 and 3 discuss the impact of  the introduction of  devolution to Northern Ireland, Scotland and
Wales (and arguably Greater London) in the late 1990s. This change has called into question tradit ional
perceptions of  the idea of  the UK as a unitary state. Devolution seems unlikely to be undone (aside f rom
the possibility of  some kind of  crisis in Northern Ireland); and the movement is towards greater
autonomy (and perhaps secession f or Scotland). But once more the outcome f or the UK as a whole is
unclear. How will the lack of  devolution in England be handled? Might the UK move more clearly towards a
f ederal system, possibly set out in a written constitution?
To return to the constitutional status of  the Civil Service, block 2 of  the Audit shows how various
changes have impacted upon it over recent decades. Special advisers, temporary civil servants appointed
on ministerial patronage and exempted f rom impartiality requirements, have come to be used increasingly
since they were f irst introduced in the 1960s. From the late 1980s, the ‘Next Steps’ ref orms led to large
portions of  Civil Service activity being shif ted away f rom the immediate control of  ministers into arms-
length bodies. Increasingly government activit ies have been outsourced to the private sector. The
Freedom of  Inf ormation Act 2000 and associated init iatives have brought many more of  the specif ic
transactions of  government into the public domain. Parliament, in its role as overseer of  the executive,
has seen its resources to some extent enhanced (though there seem to have been a squeeze recently)
and produces a larger volume of  work. In 2010 the Constitutional Ref orm and Governance Act provided
f or the f irst t ime a statutory basis f or the Civil Service.
Yet against this background of  change the basic constitutional principle that civil servants are largely
accountable to Parliament only indirectly through ministers continues to be asserted. Problems can be
identif ied with this idea. Perhaps most seriously, it is unrealistic to hold ministers responsible f or all that
takes place under their theoretical control. In recent cases, senior civil servants have been put into
dif f icult posit ions by ministers who have insisted on questionable arrangements involving special
advisers or inf ormal outside aides.
But if  we are to make a break with the existing constitutional posit ion, with what shall we replace it? If
civil servants increasingly become directly accountable to Parliament, the implication is that they are less
under the control of  ministers. Ministers, rather than rely on career civil servants, might in turn become
more disposed towards utilising aides drawn f rom beyond Whitehall, either as special advisers, or placed
in supposedly impartial Whitehall roles, or with no of f icial status at all. In the process government might
become less transparent and the existing model of  an impartial Civil Service be undermined.
Furthermore, it might be asked; if  Parliament is able to call individual civil servants to account f or their
actions, what will this practice actually amount to? Will parliamentarians be able to do any more than
express dissatisf action at what they regard as unsatisf actory outcomes? Once again a ref orm agenda
which may have some merit will have led into uncertain territory.
The conclusion may be that there are some more underlying democratic arrangements in the UK which
require attention. The Audit notes that the UK lacks a consistent constitutional amendment procedure
and suf f ers as a consequence f rom piecemeal ref orm and democratic incoherence. Moreover, the
research f inds that, even since devolution, the UK as a whole remains a massively over-centralised state.
In such circumstances, it will be dif f icult f or any accountability mechanism to f unction ef f ectively.
Note:  This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of the British Politics and Policy blog,
nor of the London School of Economics. Please read our comments policy before posting.
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